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REASON AND WILL: A COMMENT
GEORGE C. CHRISTIE*
The importance of Ioannis Tassopoulos’ theme, “reason and
will”1 in the context of the Greek Constitution, cannot be
overemphasized.  As Tassopoulos has reminded us, the turbulent
social and political history of modern Greece over the last 60 years—
featuring foreign invasions during the Second World War, followed
by a bitter and brutal civil war, then by a parliamentary democracy
haunted by a fear of the reemergence of the communist threat, and
eventually, by a repressive military dictatorship that only ended in
1974—has guaranteed that the modern constitutional history of
Greece would differ greatly from that of the United States.
Furthermore, the turbulence of the last 60 years did not follow a
period of relative tranquillity.  From the very beginning of its
emergence as a modern state following the revolution of 1821, Greece
has had a tumultuous political history.2
For these reasons, it is only now, when Greece has at last become
a proud member of the European Community and a truly democratic
republic with stable institutions, that any meaningful comparisons
between Greek and American constitutional practice can be made.
However, any such comparisons must still be made in light of
Greece’s very distinctive history.  Greece’s turbulent past explains
why the constitutional protections afforded by the Greek
Constitution and interpreted by the Greek courts take on such great
importance in the Greek context.  Moreover,  in addition to these
historical considerations, structural reasons explain why the inquiry
into the interplay between reason and will takes on added significance
in the Greek context.  It is these structural reasons that I wish to
discuss briefly in this comment.
Copyright © 2000 by George C. Christie.
* James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University.
1. Ioannis A. Tassopoulos, New Trends in Greek Contemporary Constitutional Theory: A
Comment on the Interplay Between Reason and Will, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 223 (1999).
2. See generally Christopher M. Woodhouse, The Story of Modern Greece (1968).
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The most obvious difference between the constitutions of the
United States and Greece is the considerably greater length of the
Greek Constitution.  The American Constitution has only seven
articles—of which the longest by far is Article 1, which deals with the
legislative power—and twenty-seven amendments (many of which
consist only of one or two sentences) that have been adopted in the
210 years that this Constitution has endured.  This comparative
brevity has permitted many provisions of the American Constitution,
such as the First Amendment, to enter into the popular consciousness
and, combined with its antiquity, has given the American
Constitution something of a sacred aura.  Indeed, it is hard to imagine
the United States of America apart from its Constitution.
By contrast, it is very easy to imagine Greece apart from any
particular constitutional form.  After all, modern Greece has
undergone frequent constitutional changes since its emergence from
Ottoman rule following the revolution of 1821 and the Great Powers’
formal recognition of Greece as an independent state in 1832.
Moreover, like many other twentieth century constitutions, the Greek
Constitution of 1975 is very lengthy.  It has 120 articles and covers a
wide variety of subjects ranging from detailed provisions on
parliamentary procedure,3 to the retirement age of university
professors,4 to the outright prohibition of private universities.5  Like
other modern constitutions,6 among the rights the Greek Constitution
guarantees to its citizens are what Americans would call “welfare
rights,” a concept largely absent from the U.S. Constitution.  For
example, the Greek Constitution provides that “[w]ork constitutes a
right and shall enjoy the protection of the State.”7  The State is
likewise required under the Greek Constitution to “care for the social
security of working people,”8 to “care for the health of citizens,”9 and
to “adopt special measures for the protection of youth, old age, [the]
disabled and for the relief of the needy.”10
We must also note that there are significant philosophical
differences between the structures of the Greek and American
3. See  [Gr. Constitution] arts. 51-80.
4. See id. art. 16, para. 6.
5. See id. art. 16, para. 8.
6. See, e.g., CONSTITUZIONE [Constitution] arts. 35-38 (Italy); KONSTYTUCJA
[Constitution] arts. 64-72 (Pol.).
7.  [Gr. Constitution] art. 22, para. 1.
8. Id. art. 22, para. 4.
9. Id. art. 21, para. 3.
10. Id.
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constitutions.  I am not referring to specifics, such as the Greek
Constitution’s explicit recognition in Article 3 of the Greek Orthodox
Church as an autocephalous church with exclusive authority over any
official translation of the text of “Holy Scripture . . . into any other
form of language.”11  Rather, I refer to something more fundamental.
Like the American Constitution, the Greek Constitution makes clear
that ultimate sovereignty lies with the people.  The very first article of
the Greek Constitution provides that popular sovereignty is “the
foundation of government.”12  However, unlike the American
Constitution, the Greek Constitution makes it abundantly clear that it
is the function of the State to further the expression of this popular
sovereignty in the manner specified by the Constitution.13  This helps
explain not only the inclusion of welfare rights in the Greek
Constitution, but also the prohibition on the establishment of private
universities.  Other provisions of the Greek Constitution provide that
“[g]eneral working conditions shall be determined by law”14 and that
“[t]he master plan restructuring of the country, and the reshaping,
development, town planning and expansion of towns and residential
areas in general, shall be under the regulatory authority and control
of the State.”15  The State is further required to plan and “coordinate
economic activity in the Country,”16 and “[p]rivate economic initiative
shall not be permitted to develop at the expense of freedom and
human dignity, or to the detriment of the national economy.”17
Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Greek
Constitution,18 which prevents prior restraint but allows the public
prosecutor to seize public publications after circulation for (1) “an
offence against the Christian or any other known religion;” (2)
obscenity; (3) “insult against the person of the President of the
Republic;” or (4) the disclosure of “information on the composition,
equipment and set-up of the armed forces or the fortifications of the
country.”19  Publications guilty of three such offenses within a
five-year period can be banned, and journalists so convicted can be
11. Id. art. 3, para. 3.
12. Id. art. 1, para. 2.
13. See id. art. 1, para. 3.
14. Id. art. 22, para. 2.
15. Id. art. 24, para. 2.
16. Id. art. 106, para. 1.
17. Id. art. 106, para. 2.
18. See id. art. 106, para. 2.
19. Id. art. 14, para. 3.
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prohibited from engaging in their profession.20  The Greek
Parliament, however, has never enacted legislation authorizing the
exercise of any such powers and, under present conditions, is unlikely
to do so.  Finally, it should be noted that, unlike the United States,
the prohibition of prior restraints does not apply to other media such
as motion pictures, radio, and television.21
The Greek Constitution’s guarantees of civil liberties are worded
differently than the guarantees of its American counterpart.  Many of
the guarantees contained in the U.S. Constitution are worded in
absolute terms with no qualifications.  The First Amendment to the
American Constitution declares that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . .”22  In similarly absolute terms, the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments provide, respectively, for the right to a jury trial in
criminal and civil cases.  American courts may sometimes feel obliged
to read some limits into these rights,23 but they must do so in the full
awareness that their decisions are actions in derogation of the actual
text of the American Constitution.  Other American constitutional
guarantees are expressed in qualified terms, such as the Fourth
Amendment safeguards of “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures;”24 but, it should be noted, the Fourth
Amendment qualification focuses on the unreasonableness of the
search and not upon the ultimate social purposes sought to be
achieved by the search.
By contrast, the Greek Constitution follows the common civil-
law practice of announcing an absolute right and then following that
declaration with the authority to derogate the right for certain public
20. See id. art. 14, para. 6.
21. Id. art. 15, para. 1.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. Although the reluctance of American courts to countenance any prior restraints of the
press are well known, many Justices have refused to rule out the possibility that an injunction
might be available in wartime to restrain publication of the date upon which a convoy would
sail.  See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring).  This was the famous Pentagon Papers case.
24.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  It should not be forgotten that the Fourth Amendment was
adopted against a background of resistance to the British government’s use of searches,
pursuant to general warrants, to suppress political dissent.  See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 95
Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), cited with approval in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626
(1886).  That is, the Fourth Amendment was adopted to prevent state interests from being used
to justify searches and seizures.
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policy reasons.25  For example, Article 19 of the Greek Constitution
provides that the
secrecy of letters and all other forms of free correspondence or
communication shall be absolutely inviolable.  The guarantees
under which the judicial authority shall not be bound by the secrecy
for reasons of national security or for the purpose of investigating
especially serious crimes, shall be specified by law.26
A similar example is found in Article 14, which declares flatly that
“[t]he press is free,”27 but then follows that declaration with
authorization for the seizure of newspapers after publication for
certain stated reasons.28  In the same constitutional provision, the
Greek Parliament is directed to specify “[t]he conditions and
qualifications requisite for the practice of the profession of
journalist.”29  The Greek Parliament has wisely declined to do so.
Even provisions guaranteeing certain rights that do not contain any
statements authorizing derogation in certain circumstances are
subject to Article 25, which declares that “[t]he abusive exercise of
rights is not permitted”30 and that “[t]he State shall have the right to
claim of all citizens to fulfill the duty of social and national
solidarity.”31  These are awesome powers that are given to the
executive and legislative branches of the Greek government.  In his
discussion of “Alevras’ Vote,”32 Tassopoulos reminds us that, if a
constitution is to be more than a document that apportions authority
among the various branches of government, it must impose upon
those who derive their authority from that instrument the obligation
to exercise their authority in a principled way.  All constitutions
inevitably generate what might be called political questions, but the
fact that a question of constitutional law is described as a political
question does not mean that its resolution must be found in the
exercise of power.
To its credit, the Greek Constitution, unlike the American
Constitution, specifically provides for judicial review, as noted by
25.  For a discussion of the forms of legal argument common in civil-law countries, see
George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 698
(1998).
26.   [Constitution] at art. 19.
27. Id. art. 14, para. 2.
28. Id. art. 14, para. 3.
29. Id. art. 14, para. 8.
30. Id. art. 25, para. 3.  See Fletcher, supra note 25 (discussing the civil-law use of this style
of argument).
31.  [Constitution] art. 25, para. 4.
32. Tassopoulos, supra note 1, at 232-35.
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Tassopoulos.33  While political questions may escape that review, most
constitutional questions are not political ones.  Given the greater
detail of the Greek Constitution and the interventionist nature of the
Greek State, the occasions for the judiciary to grapple with a vast
number of constitutional questions can be expected to be much more
numerous than would be the case in the United States.  Moreover,
unlike the United States, where constitutional adjudication proceeds
according to the practice of the common law (that is, the case-by-case
method in which a vast accretion of case law informs and cabins the
discretion of judges), Greece is a civil-law country in which the
method of decision focuses not on precedent but on the application of
broad general principles to the facts of the pending case.  In such a
system, the tension between reason and will is particularly acute.
Tassopoulos has shown why the resolution of that tension is and will
continue to be crucial to the flowering of free and democratic
government in Greece.
As Tassopoulos points out, this tension will not be resolved by
reference to what he calls the “sometimes sterile black-letter law.”34
Given the structure and language of the Greek Constitution, this can
easily lead to routine sustaining of legislative encroachments of
fundamental rights on the basis of an “unspecified public or general
interest.”35  Nor is “ad hoc pragmatism”36 the solution, even if the
constitutionalization of complex social issues might naturally incline
courts in this direction.  Rather, the structure of the Greek legal
system makes it essential to resort to principle.  How this is to be
done is the question.  Appeals to global principles that show the legal,
political, and moral history of a society in its best light, as envisaged
by Ronald Dworkin,37 are likely to be even less successful in the
Greek context than they are in the Anglo-American context.38  Still,
as Tassopoulos maintains, something along the more modest lines
envisaged by Professor Herbert Wechsler in his call for “neutral
principles” of constitutional adjudication,39 seems both possible and
desirable.
33. See  [Constitution] art. 87, para. 2.
34. Tassopoulos, supra note 1, at 235.
35. Id. at 238.
36. Id. at 240.
37. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
38. See George C. Christie, The Uneasy Place of Principle in Tort Law, 49 SMU L. REV.
525 (1996).
39. See Herbert Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
